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Abstract. We study the behaviour of rational agents in exchange protocols which
rely on trustees. We allow malicious parties to compromise the trustee by paying
a cost and, thereby, present a game analysis that advocates exchange protocols
which induce balanced risks on the participants. We also present a risk-balanced
protocol for fair confidential secret comparison.
1 Introduction
Exchange protocols aim to establish successful exchanges of electronic goods between
two parties who possibly have conflicting interests. Fairness, stipulating that either both
or none of the parties achieve their goals, is recognised as a crucial requirement for
exchange protocols (e.g. see [1]). Achieving fairness in deterministic asynchronous ex-
change protocols with no trusted parties is however impossible [6]. The existing meth-
ods, therefore, either are based on gradual release of information or gradual increase of
privilege to approximate fairness, or rely on trusted third parties (TTPs).
This paper focuses on exchange protocols which rely on a TTP, while malicious
participants are allowed to, by paying a cost, compromise the TTP.1 We thereby present
a game analysis that advocates protocols which induce (nearly) the same amount of
risk on the participants. Our main result states that in such risk-balanced protocols, the
difference between participants’ utilities is limited to a factor independent of the TTP’s
trustworthiness. Hence, none of the participants would hugely suffer compared to the
other one, in case the trustee is compromised by the opponent.
Existing game analyses of exchange protocol assume non-compromisable trustees,
e.g. [2,3,5,9]. This is in contrast to the premise of our analysis that TTPs, by paying
a cost, can be compromised. In a similar study, the authors of [10] assume that par-
ticipants may have limited trust in TTPs and propose algorithms to determine whether
a rational agent would engage in an exchange using cascades of TTPs or not. They
however do not consider that participants may have the choice to compromise TTPs.
Studying the ways a compromised TTP may affect fair exchange protocols and meth-
ods to limit its damages are not well studied. As a notable exception to this, Asokan
explores the concept of verifiable TTPs [1] in optimistic protocols, where the TTP’s
incentive for cheating is lowered, as its malicious behaviour can be detected.
As an example of a risk-balanced protocol, we present a fair protocol for confiden-
tially comparing secrets. Existing protocols for this purpose either do not aim at fair-
ness [7], or do not involve TTPs [13,14], thus only achieve probabilistic fairness, or are
universal multi-party computing protocols [4] that are not optimised for this task.
1 Note that a trusted entity, in general, may not be trustworthy, cf. [8].
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2 Game Abstraction of Exchange Protocols
From a game theoretical point of view, a two-party exchange protocol with a compro-
misable TTP can be seen as a two-party strategic game, in which the agents can either
follow the protocol faithfully or compromise the TTP. If both parties play faithfully,
then they normally “earn” the goods from the opponent and “lose” their own goods.
However, when engaging in the exchange, each agent has to take some risk due to the
fact that the opponent may manage to compromise the TTP. In such cases, the agent
who compromises the TTP can earn the amount that the other (honest) party risks, and
lose only the cost of compromising the TTP.
Formally, we have the following game abstraction 2:
Definition 1. (Protocol game) Given a two-party exchange protocol Prot with a TTP,
the strategic game G(Prot) is defined as follows:
A\B HB DHB
HA gAB − gAA , gBA − gBB −rAA, rBA − cB
DHA rAB − cA,−rBB rAB − rAA − cA, rBA − rBB − cB
where Hx is the strategy of x that is according to the protocol; DHx is the strategy
of x in which x compromises the TTP and may stop following the normal course of
the protocol when she has to release its goods; gyx is y’s evaluation of the goods that x
wants to exchange; ryx is y’s evaluation of the risk that x has, if the TTP is compromised
by the opponent of x; and cx is the cost x pays to compromise the TTP. 3
In the following we assume:
– Agents have incentives to exchange goods: gyx > gxx if x = y. For simplicity, we
assume that there is a fixed exchange rate ρ > 1 such that gyx = ρgxx , x = y.
– The risks of the agents comply with the same exchange rate: ryx = ρrxx , x = y.
– The subjective values of the goods are the same: gAA = gBB = g > 0.
– The costs of compromising the TTP are the same for both agents: cA = cB = c.
With these assumptions, G(Prot) can be simplified to SG(Prot):
A\B HB DHB
HA (ρ − 1)g, (ρ − 1)g −a, ρa − c
DHA ρb − c,−b ρb − a − c, ρa − b − c
Where a = rAA and b = rBB .
To apply game theoretical analysis, we assume that the agents are rational utility-
maximisers. A strategy profile is a joint strategy that determines a unique utility pair; for
example (HA,HB) is a strategy profile while ((ρ− 1)g, (ρ− 1)g) is the corresponding
utility pair. A strategy profile (SA, SB) is called a Nash equilibrium if no agent gets
higher utility by switching to another strategy, given the strategy of the other agent
2 Due to space constraints we omit introducing basics of game theory, and instead refer to [11].
3 We assume that both parties can compromise the TTP at the same time. For example, they both
may exploit vulnerabilities in the TTP’s software to read certain information off its storage.
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according to the profile. In this paper, we consider the Nash equilibria of a simplified
protocol game as the expected executions of the corresponding protocol by rational
agents. We write Utilityx(SA, SB) as the utility of x if the agents select the strategy
profile (SA, SB).
3 Risk Balance
We define a requirement on exchange protocols, which we call Δ-condition, that puts
an upper bound on the difference between the risks that a protocol induces on its par-
ticipants. We show that this condition in turn puts a limit on the difference between
participants’ expected utilities. The limit on utility differences turns out to be indepen-
dent of c. This is a desirable property since it ensures that no matter how trustworthy the
TTP might be in an execution, the difference between participants’ utilities is limited to
a value independent of c, hence none of the participants would hugely suffer (or benefit)
compared to the other one. This can be interpreted as fairness in a meta level.
In the following, when the context of the simplified protocol game is clear, let Δ =
|a − b| and ΔU (SA, SB) = |UtilityA(SA, SB) − UtilityB(SA, SB)|.
Definition 2. An exchange protocol Prot satisfies Δ-condition iff Δ < (1 − 1ρ )g in
SG(Prot). Such a protocol Prot is called risk-balanced.
Now we are ready to state the main theoretical result of the paper:
Theorem 1. For any risk-balanced protocol Prot, there are Nash equilibria in
SG(Prot), and for each such Nash equilibrium (SA, SB) the following holds:
ΔU (SA, SB) < (ρ − 1
ρ
)g.
Proof. Suppose Prot satisfies Δ-condition, then we have:
ΔU (DHA,DHB) = |ρb − a − c − (ρa − b − c)| = (ρ + 1)Δ < (ρ − 1
ρ
)g
Now, since ΔU (HA,HB) = |(ρ − 1)g − (ρ − 1)g| = 0, we only need to prove the
following two claims to prove the theorem:
1. Under the Δ−condition, (HA,DHB) and (DHA,HB) are not the Nash equilibria
of SG(Prot).
2. Either (HA,HB) or (DHA,DHB) is a Nash equilibrium of SG(Prot).
Proof of (1): Suppose (HA,DHB) is a Nash equilibrium of SG(Prot), then according
to the definition of Nash equilibrium we have:{
UtilityA(HA,DHB) ≥ UtilityA(DHA,DHB)
UtilityB(HA,DHB) ≥ UtilityB(HA,HB)
namely, ⎧⎨
⎩
−a ≥ ρb − a − c
⇒ ρa − ρb ≥ (ρ − 1)g
ρa − c ≥ (ρ − 1)g
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It follows that Δ ≥ (1− 1ρ )g, contradicting the Δ-condition. For the case of (DHA,HB),
proof goes likewise.
Proof of (2): Suppose (HA,HB) is not a Nash equilibrium, then either A or B can
be better off by switching to a dishonest strategy, given that the opponent sticks to
the honest strategy. Without loss of generality, we assume A can get higher utility
by switching from HA to DHA, namely, ρb − c > (ρ − 1)g. Since (ρ − 1)g > 0
then ρb − c − a > −a. It follows that DHA is the strictly dominant strategy for
A. Given that A chooses DHA, we argue that B will also choose DHB as follows:
UtilityB(DHA,DHB) − UtilityB(DHA,HB) = ρa − b − c − (−b) = ρa − c ≥
ρ(b−Δ)− c = ρb− c− ρΔ > (ρ− 1)g − (ρ− 1)g = 0. It follows that (DHA,DHB)
is a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose (DHA,DHB) is not a Nash equilibrium, then either A or B can be better
off by switching to a honest strategy. Without loss of generality, we assume that A can
get higher utility by switching from DHA to HA. Therefore −a > ρb − a − c, namely
0 > ρb − c. It follows that HA is the strictly dominant strategy for A. Given that A
chooses HA, B will also choose HB since UtilityB(HA,HB)−UtilityB(HA,DHB) =
(ρ − 1)g − (ρa − c) ≥ (ρ − 1)g − (ρ(b + Δ) − c) = (ρ − 1)g − (ρb − c + ρΔ)
> (ρ − 1)g − (ρ − 1)g = 0. Therefore, (HA,HB) is a Nash equilibrium. unionsq
Remark 1. According to theorem 1, under the Δ−condition, ΔU is either 0 or (ρ+1)Δ.
A robust protocol would minimise ΔU independent of ρ and g, by guaranteeing Δ = 0,
namely a = b, which implies ΔU = 0.
4 A Fair Risk-Balanced Exchange Protocol
In this section, inspired by the confidential secret comparison protocol of [13], we de-
sign two exchange protocols that rely on TTPs. The first one, undesirably, violates
the Δ-condition, serving as a concrete example for motivating risk-balanced protocols.
Then, we propose a protocol which, under certain conditions, is risk-balanced.
Notations. We assume that each two parties X and Y share a secret symmetric key
K(XY ). 4 We write [M ]K for the encryption of M with key K. It is assumed that
the participants have access to a secure encryption algorithm, and a one-way collision-
resistant hash function h. Agents A and B are the players of our protocols, whom we
assume share a secret nonce ℵ. The TTP is named Γ .
A fair confidential secret comparison protocol. Let EP , for P ∈ {A,B}, denote P ’s
knowledge set. Suppose A wants to prove to B that she knows of a secret I (that is
I ∈ EA). However, if B does not already know of I (that is I ∈ EB), A does not want
to reveal I to him. Moreover, A and B wish to exchange this epistemic statement “I
know I.” mutually, and, in a fair manner.
The goal is thus to design a protocol that achieves the following (cf. [13]): (G1) Only
if both A and B know I, then A learns that B knows I, and likewise for B. (G2) By
means of the protocol, only A and B, and no one else, may learn that A or B know I.
4 We could as well construct our protocols based on asymmetric encryption techniques.
74 M. Torabi Dashti and Y. Wang
(G3) By means of the protocol, no one learns I. (G4) B learns that A knows I, iff A
learns that B knows I (which is fairness).
To achieve these goals, we follow the straightforward approach of using on-line
TTPs, e.g. see [15] (considering off-line TTPs being left as future work). Below, ⇒
denotes communicating over confidential authenticated channels, sending a message
over insecure channels is denoted by →, and FTP is a secure publicly accessible server
operated by Γ . We write Γ ↓ FTP : a when Γ makes a available on FTP.
1. A ⇒ Γ : (fprov, A,B, ω), where ω = h(I,ℵ, A,B)
2. B ⇒ Γ : (fverif , A,B,ΩB), where ΩB = {h(i,ℵ, A,B) | i ∈ EB}
3. Γ checks if ω ∈ ΩB. If yes, then Γ ↓ FTP : ω, else Γ ↓ FTP : ⊥.
4. A,B fetch the result from FTP.
Flags fprov and fverif merely indicate the purposes of the corresponding messages. It is
easy to check that goals G1, G2 and G3 are achieved. In particular, Γ does not learn the
content of the exchanged secret I. Besides, using confidential channels is only to protect
the content of A’s message from B, and vice versa. An outsider would not benefit from
observing these messages in plain, as she does not know ℵ. She may however observe
whether an exchange is a successful comparison of some secret or not (cf. § 5).
The protocol is fair (G4) as B learns that A possesses I iff A learns that I ∈ EB .
Using public announcements on FTP ensures that benign communication failures cannot
deprive the participants from achieving fairness. Using authenticated channels is needed
to ensure the freshness of the requests. Without these, A could, e.g., compose ω′ =
h(I ′,ℵ, A,B) with I ′ = I and replay B’s old message to Γ , and learn whether I ′ ∈
EB or not, while B not even being aware that this new comparison takes place. 5
A severe defect of the protocol is nonetheless the uneven risk distribution that it
induces. The security of this protocol obviously relies on Γ being correct. If Γ is com-
promised by A in the course of the protocol, then B will be seriously harmed since
A (together with Γ ), once getting access to ΩB , can later on check any piece of in-
formation against EB without contacting B. However, if B takes the control of Γ in
his hands, then he can only check one single I against EB . This infringes on the pro-
tocol’s fairness in a meta level: if A compromises Γ , the amount of harm to B is not
proportional to the harm caused to A when Γ is compromised by B. Therefore, when
engaging in the protocol, B takes more risk than A, hence causing b  a, if |EB|  1
(see § 3).
A fair risk-balanced exchange protocol. Below, we propose an extension of the pre-
vious protocol that is risk-balanced. The idea is to force A to contact B for each I that
she wants to compare against EB . For this purpose, we use a scheme similar to RSA
encryption [12] and blind signatures. For each exchange, B randomly chooses two dis-
tinct large prime numbers p and q and computes n = p · q and φ = (p − 1) · (q − 1).
Then, B chooses a random number α, such that 1 < α < φ and gcd(α, φ) = 1, i.e. α
and φ are relatively prime. B then calculates α¯ satisfying α.α¯ ≡ 1 mod φ. Below, it is
assumed that EB is an ordered set, and, as before, I is the secret to be checked against
5 B could learn the results of such comparisons via FTP, if he knew that he should fetch these
results. Honest B must however not be forced to periodically poll the FTP server.
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EB . We assume that I and elements of EB can be encoded as integers smaller than n.
1. B generates n and (α, α¯) as described above. B then computes π = h(ω1, · · · , ω),
where ωj = h(iα¯j mod n), when EB = {i1, · · · , i}.
2. B → A : α, n
3. A generates a random number λ < n such that gcd(λ, n) = 1.
4. A → B : (I · λα) mod n
5. B → A : (I · λα)α¯ mod n, π
6. A computes ((I · λα)α¯λ−1) mod n = Iα¯ mod n. Then A lets ω = h(Iα¯ mod n).
7. A → Γ : [fprov, A,B, ω, π]K(AΓ )
8. B → Γ : [fverif , A,B,ΩB]K(BΓ ), where ΩB = {ω1, · · · , ω}
9. Γ checks whether π corresponds to ΩB . If yes then
Γ checks whether ω ∈ ΩB. If yes, then
Γ ↓ FTP : ω, and A,B fetch the result from FTP.
else
Γ ↓ FTP : ⊥, and A,B fetch the result from FTP.
It can be checked that this protocol satisfies G1, G2, G3 and G4. Note that authenticated
channels are not used in this protocol. This is because, differently from the previous
protocol, the freshness of the messages need not be checked by the TTP, since to replay
A’s message, B would need to construct another set E ′B with the same π value as of
EB , which is infeasible as h is collision-resistant. Similarly, to replay B’s message, A
would need to contact B to compute I ′α¯ for a new I ′, hence giving B the choice to use
a new α¯ or decline the exchange altogether.
Concerning risk balance, if A compromises Γ , then she can cheat on B with com-
puting ω ∈ ΩB without informing B of the result. However, to check another secret
I ′ = I against ΩB she needs to contact B. Similarly, if B compromises Γ , he can only
cheat on A by computing ω ∈ ΩB without informing A of the result. The risks induced
on A and B are thus equal, given that losing one piece of information causes the same
harm from both A’s and B’s points of view. In this case, we have a = b (see § 3),
implying ΔU = 0, hence the protocol being risk-balanced.
To summarise, if Γ is not compromised, then the protocol satisfies G1, G2, G3 and
G4. In case Γ is compromised, the protocol may not achieve G4 anymore. Rational
agents will however end up with equal utilities even when Γ is compromised. In other
words, the amount of expected harm to a cheated B would be limited and proportional
to the damage that B could cause to A if Γ was compromised by B, and vice versa.
5 Discussions
We motivate why the values of Iα¯ and iα¯, i ∈ EB need to be hashed in our risk-
balanced protocol. We assume that these values were not hashed and, thereby, demon-
strate an attack on the protocol which undermines its risk balance.
Let us assume that ω = Iα¯ and ωj = iα¯j , all computed modulo n, thus removing
the hash function from the protocol. The idea of the attack is that if A compromises
Γ , then she gets access to the members of EB . This is because A knows α (message
2 above) and with compromising Γ , she gets access to {iα¯j | ij ∈ EB}, from which
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she would be able to compute {(iα¯j )α mod n | ij ∈ EB} = EB . We conclude that in
case hash functions were not used in the protocol, A, by compromising Γ , could cause
more damage to B, compared to the damage B could cause to A by compromising Γ
(compare with the first protocol of section 4). This can undermine the protocol’s risk
balance, and, thus has to be prevented.
Below, we mention two shortcomings of our risk-balanced protocol. Addressing
these issues constitute our future work. (1) We note that in the protocol, Γ would al-
ways learn whether the exchange was successful or not (outsider parties can easily be
prevented from seeing the result altogether, e.g. using encryption), although the shared
information I is not revealed to Γ . Leaking this little information can in principle be
harmful to the participants: An interrogator who knows that you share some secret with
a comrade would be hard to thwart before you both reveal that very secret. Hiding this
information from Γ remains to be studied. (2) A drawback of the protocol is its com-
munication costs and the computation burden it imposes on Γ . The computation cost on
B is also much heavier than A. Equivalent protocols with less, and evenly distributed,
computation and communication costs are thus desirable.
Acknowledgements. We are grateful to Wouter Teepe for many helpful discussions, and
to Srijith Nair for commenting on an earlier version of the paper.
References
1. Asokan, N.: Fairness in electronic commerce. PhD thesis, University of Waterloo (1998)
2. Buttya´n, L., Hubaux, J.: Toward a formal model of fair exchange – a game theoretic approach.
Technical Report SSC/1999/39, EPFL, Lausanne (1999)
3. Buttya´n, L., Hubaux, J., Capkun, S.: A formal model of rational exchange and its application
to the analysis of syverson’s protocol. J. Computer Security 12(3-4), 551–587 (2004)
4. Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.: Optimistic fair secure computation. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO
2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 93–111. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
5. Chadha, R., Mitchell, J., Scedrov, A., Shmatikov, V.: Contract signing, optimism, and advan-
tage. In: Amadio, R.M., Lugiez, D. (eds.) CONCUR 2003. LNCS, vol. 2761, pp. 366–382.
Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
6. Even, S., Yacobi, Y.: Relations among public key signature systems. Technical Report 175,
Computer Science Dept., Technion, Haifa, March (1980)
7. Fagin, R., Naor, M., Winkler, P.: Comparing information without leaking it. Commun.
ACM 39(5), 77–85 (1996)
8. Gollmann, D.: Why trust is bad for security. ENTCS 157(3), 3–9 (2006)
9. Imamoto, K., Zhou, J., Sakurai, K.: An evenhanded certified email system for contract sign-
ing. In: Qing, S., Mao, W., Lopez, J., Wang, G. (eds.) ICICS 2005. LNCS, vol. 3783, pp.
1–13. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
10. Ito, C., Iwaihara, M., Kambayashi, Y.: Fair exchange under limited trust. In: Buchmann,
A.P., Casati, F., Fiege, L., Hsu, M.-C., Shan, M.-C. (eds.) TES 2002. LNCS, vol. 2444, pp.
161–170. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
11. Osborne, M., Rubinstein, A.: A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Redmond, Washington
(1999)
12. Rivest, R., Shamir, A., Adleman, L.: A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key
cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21(2), 120–126 (1978)
Risk Balance in Exchange Protocols 77
13. Teepe, W.: Reconciling Information Exchange and Confidentiality — A Formal Approach.
PhD thesis, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (2006)
14. Traore, J., Boudot, F., Schoenmakers, B.: A fair and efficient solution to the socialist million-
aires’ problem. Discrete Applied Mathematics 111, 23–36 (2001)
15. Zhou, J., Gollmann, D.: A fair non-repudiation protocol. In: Security and Privacy 1996, pp.
55–61. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (1996)
